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“It was a bit my fault and a bit his fault": Mothers' and Early School-aged Children’s Blame 




In a sample of 36 dyads, this study investigated mothers’ and their 6-7-year-old children’s 
blaming strategies when engaged in conversations about the children’s peer conflicts. Each dyad 
discussed two conflicts in which the child was hurt, one to which they felt they contributed 
(shared fault) and the other in which they felt they did not contribute to the conflict (no fault). 
We specifically examined: (1) how conversations about the two events differed in terms of 
maximizing and mitigating blame attributions across three contexts (the peer’s harm against the 
child, child’s harm to the peer, and the child’s self-protection from harm) (2) variations between 
mothers and children’s maximizing and mitigating blame strategies (3) the specific dimensions 
that mothers and children considered in making blame attributions. Results revealed that families 
maximized responsibility more in the no fault conversations in the context of harm to the child 
and self-protection from harm, whereas they maximized blame concerning the child’s harm to 
his/her peer more in the shared fault conversations. Comparing mothers and children, findings 
indicated that mothers maximized blame more in self-protection contexts, whereas children 
maximized blame for the peers’ harm to child and mitigated responsibility across all contexts. 
Regarding dimensions of blame attribution, avoidability and consequences of harm were used 
most often by families. Mothers referenced avoidability and act evaluations most frequently 
whereas children more often discussed presence of harmful acts and subsequent responses to 
one’s own harm. Findings suggest that maternal socialization of blame is context-sensitive as 
mother-child dyads are listening to and largely agreeing with each other. Mothers’ emphasis on 
self-protection raises questions about parental concerns for children’s responsibility and agency 
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Human relationships inevitably generate harm; in the course of ongoing relationships, 
people occasionally get hurt and hurt others, whether the offender intended harm or not. As 
children navigate the challenges implicated in managing hurt, this constitutes a context for the 
development of moral agency. Moral agency is a term used to describe “people’s understanding 
and experience of themselves (and others) as agents whose morally relevant actions are based in 
goals and beliefs” (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010, p.55). Grappling with harm means that an 
individual assesses their internal beliefs and expectations as well as their obligations to others. 
When hurt, they recognize that one or more of these obligations has been broken, potentially 
entailing acceptance, reparation, and/or forgiveness. Also, accepting oneself as a potential harm-
doer can ease the tension that one can have when they have been the perpetrator of hurt. 
Confronting and wrestling with these issues – as well as making tough decisions, adjusting one’s 
desires, and compromising, among other things – can serve as catalysts for the development of a 
person’s moral agency.  
 Conversations with others serve as an important context for children to make meaning of 
their morally-laden experiences (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). In particular, children’s intimate 
relationships with parents provide a unique context for developing and furthering moral agency. 
Parents’ roles include listening and responding to children’s stories about harm (Pasupathi & 
Wainryb, 2010) as well as elaborating, validating children’s viewpoints, and challenging them to 
promote meaning-making (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). Also, encouraging children to consider 
the internal psychological bases for their harmful behavior drives them to take responsibility for 
their actions.  
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 Although the role of parents has been foregrounded in the moral socialization process, it 
is worth noting that children play an active role in constructing personal meanings out of their 
moral experiences (Smetana, 2013). As early as age 3, they are able to evaluate others’ 
perspectives in order to pass judgments about intentions underlying harmful behavior, among 
other things (e.g. Darley & Schultz, 1990). Thus, children and their parents each play an active 
role in drawing meanings and arriving at moral decisions. As such, this thesis does not align 
solely with a perspective on socialization as a unidirectional transmission of norms from parents 
to children, wherein child behavior gradually adapts to reflect parental expectations. On the 
contrary, socialization is conceptualized as a joint endeavor between parents (mothers) and 
children (6-7-year-olds). For example, children may challenge parental views in an attempt to 
make meaning of their social and moral experiences, sometimes even redefining parental 
perspectives (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). Ultimately, moral socialization involves a bidirectional 
process between parents and children, and parent-child conversations about children’s peer 
conflicts provide such a vehicle for the interplay of the bidirectional moral socialization process. 
 Research provides evidence that children hold diverse perspectives regarding their peer 
conflicts depending on how they are positioned within events (e.g., as victim or perpetrator; 
Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). Likewise, mothers may be most effective in helping children 
to further their moral agency when they take into account the particulars of children’s varied 
experiences with harm. Although there is evidence to suggest that mothers are indeed sensitive to 
variations across children’s conflicts (Scirocco, Recchia, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2018), no 
research has directly examined how mothers’ socialization strategies vary depending on the 
extent to which they perceive their children to be responsible for contributing to peer conflict. As 
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such, it is unknown what specific strategies mothers employ to attribute blame to their child or 
the peer involved when discussing peer conflicts, and how these vary across events. 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate mothers’ and children’s differing blame 
attributions based on variations in whether the child felt they did or did not contribute to a 
conflict in which they were harmed by a peer. In the subsequent sections, theoretical models 
regarding blame will be presented, followed by a review of the literature concerning children and 
parents’ reasoning about blame and parental moral socialization. Finally, expected patterns 
regarding contextual variations of maternal blame attributions will be discussed. 
Conceptualizing Blame 
 Blame is a judgment regarding an agent’s actions or behavior and the outcomes they 
produce (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Society thrives upon values and norms such as 
self-control and respecting people’s rights which, when broken, have consequences for human 
welfare. Morality therefore requires that people’s actions and inactions are assessed to facilitate 
positive behavior and outcomes, while preventing harm. Alicke (2000) describes blame as “an 
aspect of everyday conduct evaluation that identifies behavior as morally wrong or socially 
opprobrious” (p.556). In his view, we occasionally encounter people who threaten our well-
being. As such, individuals within societies view it as part of their role to ascertain wrong 
behavior and place responsibility on wrongdoers. 
In Malle and colleagues’ (2014) conceptualization of blame, a warrant – evidence – is 
required to make a blame attribution; why is he/she blameworthy? Or what proof do you have for 
accusing an individual? Conceptual models of blame thus emphasize different forms of evidence 
as crucial for attributing blame, and extracting evidence serves as an effort to draw meaning from 
a plausibly blameworthy situation. Thus, in Malle et al.’s (2014) view, a blame judgment is 
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passed after enough evidence has been accumulated. With this in mind, the following thesis is 
based on two models of blame: the culpable control model (Alicke, 2000) and the path model 
(Malle et al., 2014). Each is described below.  
 The culpable control model. Alicke’s (2000) model presents structural linkages which 
provide evidence to adjudge a person as blameworthy or not (see Figure 1): the “mind to 
behavior” link, the “behavior to consequence” link and the “mind to consequence” link. The 
model is mainly concerned with personal control, which is deemed to be most relevant in 
maximizing or mitigating blame attributions. The basic idea is that if a person has access to or 
knowledge about alternatives to their behavior or an outcome, their personal control is high, and 
thus blame is maximized. As such, blame can be partly established via counterfactual reasoning, 
which answers the question, “how could the negative outcome have been prevented?” 
Counterfactuals are cognitions that suggest alternatives to past occurrences, producing negative 
affect (Roese, 1997), and generally increase blame. This notion of an outcome’s avoidability or 
preventability strengthens or weakens an agent’s personal control. According to Alicke (2000), 
the mind, behaviour and consequences of actions are structurally related in ways that regulate a 
person’s control over a situation and inform judgments of blame.  
 Volitional behaviour control (mind to behavior structural link). This link connects an 
offender’s state of mind to his behavior. Thus, essential considerations are attached to the level 
of their intentionality, planfulness, and knowledge: for example, were the agent’s actions freely 
chosen or were they coerced to commit them? Actions that occurred by accident are therefore 
less worthy of blame compared to purposeful or planned ones. 
 Causal control (behavior to consequence structural link). Personal control over a 
negative outcome is regulated by the extent of the actor’s impact on the outcome. To measure 
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impact, Alicke suggests observing the actor’s unique contribution to the outcome, the sufficiency 
of his behavior to cause the outcome, and the proximity of his particular behavior in relation to 
the outcome. As such, mitigating factors that reduce the agent’s causal control serve to reduce 
blameworthiness.  To provide a concrete example, if a child kicked a peer so hard that they fell 
and broke an arm, others can judge this child as the unique causal agent of the broken arm. His 
blameworthiness heightens particularly when nothing else could have caused the broken arm.  
 Volitional outcome control (mind to consequence). In connecting an actor’s mental state 
to the negative consequence, Alicke’s blame model addresses the offender’s desire to achieve the 
negative outcome, as well as the foreseeability of the consequence. If the offender had no desire 
for harm to occur and could not have anticipated the results of his/her actions, blame is 
mitigated. If, however, the offender intended to cause harm and/or the outcome could have been 
avoided, the offender is more culpable. 
 Other considerations. Beyond the culpable control model, Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, 
and Davis (2008) conducted additional research suggesting that attributions concerning an 
individual’s character (i.e., characterization) are a key factor in blame processing. This might 
include attributions of actors’ reputations and social attractiveness, for example. Characterization 
is embedded in spontaneous evaluations of others’ behavior; although Alicke et al. (2008) argue 
that extra-evidential information should ideally not influence blame, their research reveals that 
positive characterization of an individual minimizes blame whereas negative characterization 
maximizes blame. In other words, their research suggests that it is not just what a person does 
that make him blameworthy or not, but also who they are. A mother may say, for instance, 
“Mary is such a nuisance, and you know you should not be playing with her”. Characterization is 
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therefore an important determinant of blame attribution and also influences attributions 
concerning an outcome’s avoidability. 
 
Figure 1. Structural linkages among mental, behavioral and consequence elements. B = 
behavioral element; C = consequence element; M = mental element (Alicke, 2000). 
 
 The path model of blame. An additional model of blame was developed more recently 
by Malle et al. (2014). A number of elements of this model correspond to the culpable control 
model’s three structural links (namely, concerns with intentionality, causality and 
preventability/avoidability), but the path model is more extensive. Each of the steps in the path 
model is shown in Figure 2 and is discussed below.  
 Event detection. This is the stage at which a blamer perceives that a norm has been 
broken. Did the agent do something wrong or not? Is there anything worth blaming someone for? 
The agent may have committed an action or omitted an expectation or intended to perform a 
norm-violating deed. A mother, for example, may maximize a child’s blame by pointing out a 
transgression, by saying “I think he didn’t like it when you weren’t sharing.” On the other hand, 
she may minimize a peer’s blame by saying: “He did not do anything to start it”.  
 Agent Causality. At this stage, the blamer is trying to understand the meaning of the 
event by figuring out who caused the event in question. Based on the agent’s role, the blamer 
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attempts to determine whether the agent in question is the source of the event, and the extent to 
which they uniquely caused the event. In the context of parenting, a mother may say, for instance 
“I know he got hurt, but you weren’t the only one teasing him”. Agent causality is closely related 
to event detection in the sense that they both communicate the presence of an act by an agent 
which requires blame judgment. 
 Intentionality. This stage explores an offender’s motives for causing a negative act. 
Principally, one judges whether or not the harm caused was intentional, then they investigate the 
reasons. It is worth noting that Malle and his colleagues (2014) do not distinguish between the 
intentionality of the outcome, and the intentionality of the behavior when probing an agent’s 
intentionality. Alicke (2000) however separates intentional behavior from intentional harm. This 
is a very important distinction because people sometimes purposely set out to do things without 
envisioning a specific outcome. For example, an angry child who throws a pencil that hits his 
classmate in the eye may not have intended the injury although the outward expression of his 
anger was intentional. Thus, the behavior is intentional, but not the consequent harm. 
 In cases when an agent’s actions are clearly not intentional, attention then shifts to issues 
of preventability/avoidability (Alicke, 2000). As noted above, counterfactual reasoning is 
typically used to judge preventability. Specifically, the underlying questions are “what should 
you have done to prevent the outcome?” or “what could you have done?”. Very relevant to these 
judgments are concerns with obligation and capacity. Specifically, obligation refers to the 
expectations placed on an agent to prevent a negative event from happening based on the agent’s 
role, relationship, or context. For instance, adults may expect children to exhibit a certain level of 
maturity in dealing with their younger peers. So, a mother might increase blame for a child by 
saying “She’s younger than you, so you shouldn’t be fighting with her”. In turn, concerns with 
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capacity suggest the child has the necessary social skills/training to avoid causing harm.  
Altogether, capacity subsumes the agent’s knowledge, skills, tools, and opportunities, which 
could have been utilized to prevent harm from occurring. For instance, a mother may blame a 
child more because she expects the child to remember that she has taught him how to behave 
with his/her peers.  
 
Figure 2. The path model of blame (Malle et al., 2014) 
Prior Research on Children’s Thinking about Blame 
 Piaget’s (1932) seminal work on intentions and outcomes suggests that young children in 
the egocentric stage are largely outcome-focused when making moral judgments. More recent 
research, however, suggests that children as young as 3 are able to assess the mental states of 
individuals to evaluate their blameworthiness (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Helwig, Zelazo, & 
Wilson, 2001; Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011). Specifically, research 
has documented children’s reasoning regarding different forms of harm, including accidental 
harm, which is characterized by an offender’s positive intent and a negative outcome; intentional 
harm, which involves negative intentions and negative outcomes; and attempted (but failed) 
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harm, which entails negative intentions but positive outcomes (van Dijk, Poorthuis, Thomaes, & 
de Castro, 2018; Helwig, et al., 2001; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016).  
 Overall, research indicates that children’s relative emphasis on outcome and intent does 
shift with age, albeit less dramatically than proposed by Piaget (1932). At age 3, children are 
generally less sensitive to internal psychological experiences such as goals, desires and emotions 
(Ball, Smetana, & Sturge-Apple, 2016), and thus tend to judge actions positively or negatively 
based on observable features of events, such as outcomes (Wainryb et al., 2005). With age, 
children increasingly attend to the mental states of offenders, and thus intentions increasingly 
regulate their blame judgments. By age 6-7 therefore, children can understand and address goals, 
desires, emotions in arriving at blame judgments, among other psychological concepts. 
 In line with this shift from a focus on outcome to intent, at age 4-5, well-intentioned 
accidental harms are considered more deserving of punishment compared to ill-intentioned 
attempted harms, but this pattern is reversed for 5-6-year-olds (Nobes et al., 2016). Research by 
Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, and Carey (2013) also showed that 4-year-olds consider 
attempted but failed harms as less blameworthy than unintentional (accidental) harm. A plausible 
explanation is that preschoolers evaluate harm mainly by what they observe (the harm itself), 
thus, accidental harm is judged more severely because the observable outcome is negative, 
unlike attempted harms which may have an observable positive outcome. This dynamic changes 
by the time children turn 7 or 8; attempted harms are regarded as naughtier and more punishable 
than accidental harms. This evidence denotes older children’s regard for the importance of 
motives for pursuing an action. That is, by age 7, intentions are becoming increasingly salient in 
children’s judgments (Killen et al., 2011). 
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 Alongside ill-intentioned acts with positive outcomes, situations also arise in which 
people pursue well-intentioned acts with harmful outcomes, sometimes for the greater good. This 
is labeled “necessary harm”, and research indicates that 7-year-olds deem necessary harm as 
having legitimate intentions deserving of forgiveness (Jambon & Smetana, 2014). More broadly, 
children’s consideration of their legitimate goals appears to mitigate their judgments of their own 
blameworthiness (Wainryb et al., 2005).  A real example from Wainryb and colleagues’ study is 
as follows: “Do you think it was okay or not okay for you to tell Candice she couldn’t play with 
you?” The response was “Well, I guess we knew that she’d feel sad because of that, but all we 
wanted to do was to play alone. That’s not wrong”. Thus, in spite of foreseeability of harm, the 
legitimate goal to play alone leads to the mitigation of their own blame. In other words, in some 
cases, children appear to judge harm to others as an unfortunate but nevertheless acceptable side 
effect of their goal-directed behavior. In sum, in Wainryb et al.’s (2005) study, perpetrators 
usually accepted they had caused harm (agent causality), meaning there was a negative event or 
outcome (presence of act) (ref. Malle et al., 2014). However, it is interesting to note that they 
nevertheless mitigated their blameworthiness by presenting the harm as unintentional 
(intentionality) despite the fact that sometimes it was foreseeable.  
 Research has also examined the extent to which children can reason about blame based 
on possible alternatives to a harmful act. The concept of counterfactual reasoning suggests that if 
something else had been done, a harmful outcome could have been avoided. Research shows that 
children as young as 3 are able to think counterfactually in very simple contexts when the causal 
chain is short (German & Nichols, 2003). This means that blame is easier to comprehend in the 
absence of multiple causation. Four-year-olds, in contrast, have the working memory capacity to 
retain events in a long causal chain (German & Nichols, 2003). At age 5 and 6, children do better 
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on counterfactual reasoning vignettes compared to those aged 3 and 4 (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, 
& Apperly, 2006).  
 Children aged 3 and 4 find it easier to reason about future hypotheticals (what should 
person do next time?) rather than reason counterfactually about the past (what could he have 
done?) due to the need to suppress what actually happened in reasoning counterfactually in the 
past combined with the difficulty of grappling with multiple possibilities. But research indicates 
continued development in children’s counterfactual thinking across the school-aged years and 
into adolescence (Beck et al., 2006). In attributing blame, therefore, children in the early 
elementary years may need support to consider omitted alternative actions. However, 6-7-year-
olds are able to think counterfactually and reason about potential measures to take in the future to 
avoid harm.  
The Role of Parents in Helping Children to Develop Moral Thinking 
As part of constructing moral agency, a key question is “who determines whether or not 
an act is morally significant?” (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). Children can discern in their own 
ways whether an action is morally relevant and to decide who (between they and a peer) is to 
blame (Wainryb et al., 2005). That being said, parents may also play a role in helping children to 
make sense of their experiences, attribute blame to one or both players and to further navigate 
morally-laden experiences. Relatedly, parents can teach rules and lessons, refer to consequences 
for actions, praise and scold (i.e., evaluate actions), all of which can support children’s 
constructions of meanings out of their experiences (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017).  
As parents and children discuss situations involving conflicts with peers, the various 
morally-laden aspects of events can become clarified. In this sense, conversations provide a 
vehicle for children to grapple with the various aspects of their experiences. They provide a 
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“shared psychological space” for issues to be raised and opinions to be presented back and forth 
(Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). During this dialogical process, both parents and children can 
question each other, learn new facts, take on new perspectives, and basically begin to think 
differently about particular experiences. Additionally, mothers can agree with, challenge, and 
extend children’s opinions, all of which can facilitate meaning-making. Considering the wealth 
of experience parents have, their knowledge of their children as well as their authority over 
children, parents play a vital role in supporting moral agency development.  
 Construction of stories and moral agency. Mothers’ and children’s co-construction of 
narratives about harm-related experiences can either hinder or facilitate moral agency. According 
to Bruner (1990), a good story captures the landscape of action and the landscape of 
consciousness, that is, the proceedings and meaning of an event respectively. The presence or 
absence of the landscape of consciousness is related to a person’s level of moral agency. Thus, 
moral agency is connected to recognizing the psychological dimensions - goals, desires, beliefs, 
and emotions - of personal actions and those of others. Although younger children tend to focus 
on the observable dimensions of their conflicts (Wainryb et al., 2005), research confirms that 6-
7-year-olds are becoming capable of exploring the intentions of others when making blame 
attributions (Ball et al., 2016; Nobes et al., 2016). As such, mothers’ tendency to help children of 
this age further delve into psychological aspects of agents’ actions in conflicts may be a 
constructive tool for supporting moral agency. 
Despite the inevitability of harming and being harmed, evaluating actions, unearthing 
intentions (both of the child and his/her peer), and exploring reasons for acting and alternative 
actions that could have been taken, enable children to encounter previously unconsidered roles of 
agents (themselves and peers) in conflicts. Probing such psychological and evaluative elements 
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can serve as a tool for self-protection and for self-restoration, wherein one can view themselves 
less in essentialized ways as bad people, and more as moral agents equipped to make 
autonomous choices guided by the particularities of specific contexts (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 
2010).  Relatedly, in situations when children are harmed by others, rather than seeing 
themselves as passive victims, mothers may scaffold children’s sense of control and 
responsibility in varied ways; not only by considering the ways in which they might have also 
reciprocally harmed the other, but also in reflecting on how children could have protected 
themselves from harm. For example, a mother could say “when she threw the pencil at you, you 
could have told her “that’s not right!”” Hence, apart from knowing that harming and being 
harmed are unavoidable, mothers may explore children’s agency vis-à-vis their roles as 
recipients of harm.   
Supporting moral agency necessitates parents to play the role of listeners effectively. 
They need to be careful not to be overly threatening or intrusive, otherwise they may produce a 
combative atmosphere, which could lead to unresponsiveness or self-defensive story-telling 
(Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). That being said, challenges within parent-child conversations can 
be an asset, when used judiciously; for instance, children may further their own unique sense of 
moral agency – goals, beliefs and convictions – when they oppose or question parents’ 
perspectives (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). 
The importance of being sensitive to contextual variations in children’s experiences 
across events. Within conversations, theorists have suggested that mothers may maximize blame 
when children are not adequately attuned to their peers’ welfare, whereas they may minimize 
blame when children take “too much” responsibility for harm to others (Wainryb & Recchia, 
2017). In this sense, mothers may be sensitive to contextual variations in children’s experiences 
 14 
 
of harm. As Wainryb et al.’s (2005) study revealed, variations can be observed in children’s 
narratives depending on whether they were the victims or perpetrators. Similarly, children appear 
to construct conflict narratives differently depending on whether they deem themselves to blame 
for a given event (Bourne, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2017). As such, arguably, optimal parental 
socialization will be sensitive to these variations in children’s understandings of events (Scirocco 
et al., 2018). That is, parents can either maximize or mitigate their own children’s or the peer’s 
blameworthiness, all the while exploring the motives and intentions behind both children’s 
actions. In sum, children may enter into conversations with their own understandings of 
blameworthiness, but parental guidance may help to further scaffold their understandings of the 
various facets of blame.   
 Prior research on parenting and blame. Past research suggests that parents make more 
attributions of intentionality with children’s increasing age, and thus older children’s 
transgressions are generally judged more blameworthy than those of younger children (Dix, 
Ruble, Grusec, & Nixon, 1986; Gretarrson & Gelfand, 1988; Miller, 1995). An explanation for 
this finding is that parents expect older children to have more knowledge regarding behavioral 
norms, thus they should be held more responsible for negative outcomes. Parents therefore may 
consequently react more intensely toward older children’s transgressions (Miller, 1995). Indeed, 
Slep and O’Leary’s (1998) study of mothers of 2- to 3-year-olds also revealed that these mothers 
were angrier when they were told that their children’s misconduct was voluntary and with 
negative intentions than when they were told the children were not blameworthy for misconduct. 
Evidently, when parents perceive negative intentions, they are likely to maximize blame 
judgments. Linking this observed pattern with capacity (Malle et al., 2014), a person receives 
more blame when they are expected to have the skills and knowledge to avoid a negative 
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outcome. As such, it is possible that parents have higher expectations of older children because 
they felt that older children had been taught more social skills and moral awareness. The same 
expectation possibly applies to younger children who have been taught certain social skills. 
Thus, when children behave in ways that violate expectations, parents may be more likely to 
focus the lens on the child’s failure to employ their capacity.  
In general, parents consider their children’s positive acts to be more intentional than their 
transgressions (Gretarrson & Gelfand, 1988). In contrast, some parents may hold the belief that 
that their children’s misbehaviors such as disobedience are intentional and deserving of 
punishment. This is termed a negative attribution or bias. This belief suggests that accidents are 
deliberate and intended to annoy parents. Both mothers and fathers of 7-year olds who held such 
attributions consistently described their children’s behaviors as problematic (Nelson, O’Brien, 
Calkins, & Keane, 2013). 
 Alongside parents’ attribution biases, parenting styles can influence the conclusions that 
parents draw about children’s behaviors. Authoritarian mothers are inclined toward verbal 
hostility, corporal punishment, and punitive strategies, often without justification (Coplan, 
Hastings, Lagacé-Séguin, & Moulton, 2002). Research reveals that authoritarian mothers react 
more strongly emotionally and behaviorally to children’s misconduct (Dix et al., 1986; Dix, 
Ruble, & Zambarano, 1989). Coplan and colleagues (2002) found that authoritarian mothers 
rated negative behaviors of their 3- to 5-year-olds as more internally caused compared to positive 
behaviors. Thus, presumably, a parenting style oriented toward punishment and hostility is 




Needed Advances in Theory and Research 
The paucity of recent research regarding parental socialization of blame is a major gap in 
the literature. Specifically, to our knowledge, no studies have directly examined parents’ blame 
attributions in the context of parent-child conversations about children’s peer conflicts. 
Attribution research can indirectly speak to issues of blame, but most studies of parents’ 
attributions rely on parental responses to vignettes about hypothetical children (Coplan et al., 
2002; Dix et al., 1986; Miller, 1995). Examining parent-child conversations about children’s 
actual experiences can thus contribute to our understanding of how parents attribute blame, to 
whom and why.  
 With respect to limitations of extant blame models, Malle et al.’s (2014) blame model 
posits that offenders’ obligation and capacity are only considered when a harmful act is not 
intentional but could have been prevented. However, we argue that these two aspects of blame 
can be evaluated even when someone acted intentionally. The problem is that Malle and his 
colleagues did not distinguish between harmful behaviors and harmful outcomes. Therefore, a 
parent can attribute blame to a child who unintentionally hurt a peer’s feelings because this 
parent feels the child failed to utilize their capacity (i.e., skills available to support harm 
avoidability). 
 Furthermore, both blame models that served as a starting point for this study (Alicke, 
2000; Malle et al., 2014) failed to address certain aspects of blame attribution, which may be 
relevant to parental socialization in the context of children’s actual experiences in ongoing 
relationships. For example, a child’s subsequent response to their own harmful act may arguably 
mitigate their blame for the initial act; that is evaluating whether or not a child exhibited remorse 
for their action or tried to promote reparation. Young children are known to attribute less blame 
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to offenders who offer apologies for harmful actions (Darby & Schlenker, 1982). Additionally, 
apart from evaluating subsequent responses (presence or absence of apologies), the children in 
Darby and Schlenker’s study attributed higher responsibility to offenders who caused severe 
consequences. 
Also, more broadly, actions can be evaluated in light of harm in order to attribute 
responsibility. For instance, “it was a terrible thing to break her glasses”. Malle and colleagues 
(2014) call this “event evaluation” and argue that such “good-bad evaluations” (p.150) do not 
directly qualify as blame judgments because they do not refer to a person, and do not depend on 
social-cognitive assessment (e.g. reasons for harm). However, we consider act evaluations to be 
conceptually related to blame attributions, and hence also worthy of consideration. Additionally, 
as discussed earlier, foreseeability and avoidability (counterfactuals) are also mentioned in 
Alicke et al.’s (2008) research but they are not directly represented in the blame models. 
Consequently, subsequent response, consequences, act evaluation, foreseeability and 
avoidability are but a few concepts that have been included in the conceptualization of blame for 
the purpose of this study. 
 More broadly, in addition to filling these gaps in the literature, more work is needed to 
understand how conversations about blame might contribute to children’s moral development 
and capacity to navigate social relationships with peers. Thus, beyond studying how children and 
mothers attribute blame, a key issue is how children are relying on their experiences and their 
conversations with parents to draw deeper meaning about their moral selves. Arguably, a first 
important step in addressing these issues is to document the specific ways in which mothers and 




The Current Study 
 The current study investigated contextual variations in mothers’ and their 6-7-year-old 
children’s blame attributions when discussing the children’s past conflicts with their peers. 
Analyses were based on a larger dataset in which mothers and their children discussed two 
events when the child had been hurt or upset by a peer. In one case, the child was asked to 
nominate an event in which they “had something to do” with the conflict (e.g., they started it, or 
made it worse), and a second event in which they did not “have something to do” with the event. 
The former is henceforth called the shared fault conversation/event and the latter, the no fault 
conversation/event. This manipulation was included to examine whether maternal blame 
attributions are sensitive to the unique features of children’s different experiences.  
Coding focused on the strategies that family members employed to maximize or 
minimize either the peer or the child’s blame/responsibility. Conversations were coded to assess 
blame attributions concerning the harm that the peer caused to the child or that the child caused 
to the peer (Wainryb et al., 2005). However, to examine issues of responsibility more broadly, 
we also coded the extent to which family members judged children to be responsible for 
protecting themselves from harm (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). For example, do mothers 
suggest that their child should or could have done something (or should do something in the 
future) to prevent themselves from getting hurt by a peer? Arguably, such concerns with self-
protection may arise in situations when family members believed that the hurt can/could have 
been avoided. 
Based on the two blame models discussed above (Alicke, 2000; Malle et al., 2014), we 
also examined various facets of families’ references to blame, to investigate the different ways in 
which mothers help to scaffold their children’s understanding of their own and others’ 
responsibility for conflicts. Conversations were coded in ways that allowed us to examine issues 
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such as event detection, agent causality, intentionality/reasons, obligation, and capacity from 
Malle and colleagues’ model, as well as foreseeability, avoidability and characterological 
statements from Alicke’s model and Alicke et al.’s (2008) research. That is, mothers’ and 
children’s blame attributions were coded for the extent to which they centered on: whether the 
child or peer engaged in an act (presence of act) that had a negative impact on the victim 
(consequences), whether the act could be evaluated negatively (act evaluation), as well as 
whether the person had legitimate reasons for engaging in the act (reasons), should have been 
able to foresee negative outcomes (foreseeability), and/or had remorse for the action or attempted 
to repair the relationship (subsequent response). Additionally, attributions were also coded for 
how they explored whether the child or peer could have avoided a harmful outcome with 
alternative actions (avoidability), has a flaw in character which caused harm (characterological 
statements), has skills or knowledge which could have been employed to prevent harm 
(capacity), and/or had a role-related responsibility to prevent harm (obligation).  
More specifically, based on this detailed conversational coding, the current thesis 
addressed three related questions: (1) how do the shared fault conversations differ from the no 
fault conversations in terms of valence (mitigating and maximizing blame/responsibility) and 
context (harm to child, harm to peer, self-protection)? (2) how do mothers and children differ 
from each other in how they maximize and mitigate blame in varying contexts? (3) what are the 
specific dimensions that mothers and children draw on to make blame attributions and how do 
they use them? These are further expounded in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 In terms of differences across events, we expected to find differences between the ways 
in which families discussed responsibility and blame across the two conflicts nominated by the 
child (Scirocco et al., 2018). Specifically, in conversations about events when the child was hurt 
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by a peer and felt that he/she did not have something to do with it (no fault event), we expected 
families to most frequently focus on discussing the peer’s blameworthiness for harming the 
child. On the other hand, when the child was hurt but felt that he/she had something to do with it 
(shared fault event), we expected that discussions would include a greater focus on the ways in 
which the child was to blame for also harming the peer. In turn, we expected that references to 
responsibility for protecting oneself from harm would arise more frequently in conversations 
about no fault events, as a way of exploring the child’s own agency in situations when children 
did not deem themselves to be responsible for harm. 
 In terms of differences between mothers and children, we expected children, more than 
mothers, to maximize blame for the harm that the peer committed against them, considering that 
they were the victims in the particular event (Wainryb et al., 2005). In the same vein, we 
expected that children (more than mothers) would mitigate their own responsibility for their 
harm against the peer, because they would like to redeem their image as perpetrator (Wainryb et 
al., 2005). Conversely, we expected that mothers more than children would maximize 
responsibility for child’s self-protection from harm as a problem-solving strategy and way of 
scaffolding the child’s sense of control. 
 With regards to the third research question, given the paucity of research regarding the 
various dimensions of making blame attributions, especially in connection with children’s or 
families’ judgments of blame, we did not advance specific hypothesis but rather aimed to 
document overall patterns regarding different dimensions of blame observed in family 







 Data were collected as part of a larger study examining peer conflict in a sample that also 
included additional age groups of 10-11 and 15-16-year-old youth. Only detailed sample 
characteristics and procedures that are relevant to the current thesis are described here.  
Participants 
 The total sample included 36 mother-child dyads; 50% of children were girls. 
Participants consisted of mother-child dyads residing in and around Montreal, Quebec. They 
were recruited via Facebook advertisements, through flyers in schools, via word of mouth, and 
from databases of past participants. Participating children were between ages six to seven years 
(M = 6.95, SD = .60). Most children had siblings (83.8%). Almost the entire sample of children 
primarily spoke English at home (94.6%) and smaller proportions of children also spoke French 
(29.7%) or other languages (18.9%) at home.  
 Mothers were aged between 30 to 46 years (M = 38.22, SD = 4.16). Among the 
participating mothers, most had completed their university education (29.7%) or had pursued 
post-graduate education (13.5%). A small percentage had some university education (2.7%). 
Many had either completed (10.8%) or had some CEGEP education (8.1%). Finally, some 
participants had completed part (2.7%) or all of high school (5.4%). About 27% did not provide 
their educational background information. More than half of the final sample of mothers were 
White (56.8%). The sample also comprised some South Asian (2.7%), Chinese (2.7%), Latin 





Families participated in their homes or at a university laboratory, depending on their 
preference. Mothers provided written consent to participate in the study and children verbally 
assented to procedures. Then, in a private interview with a trained research assistant, children 
were asked to nominate two events: (1) when they have been hurt by a peer and they felt they 
had something to do with it - either that they did something to start it (even if they did not mean 
to) or to make it worse and (2) when they were hurt or upset but they felt they had nothing to do 
with it; they did not start it or make it worse.  The order of elicitation of the two events were 
counterbalanced.  
The children then engaged in a conversation with their mothers (recorded on camera) in 
the absence of the research assistant about the two specific events they selected. The events were 
discussed in the same order in which they were elicited. The instructions given for the 
conversation were for the mother and child to ask each other questions and explain things to 
make sure they understood the stories. The researcher also emphasized that the dyad should “see 
if there is something that could be learned” from the experiences. The recordings of the 
conversations were later transcribed for analysis. 
Coding 
 Based on transcripts of conversations, we identified excerpts of the mother’s and child’s 
speech that pertained to notions of blame. Each excerpt was analyzed and labeled individually. 
An individual speech turn could be divided into two or more parts and labeled separately, if a 
speaker referred to blame in multiple ways within a turn. Similarly, one utterance could be given 
multiple codes (e.g., if the mother referred to both the child and peer’s culpability collectively). 
As such, for each conversation, we coded the frequency of references to each type of blame. A 
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complete coding scheme is presented in Appendix A with definitions of each code, as well as 
examples. 
Specifically, each speech excerpt pertaining to an attribution of blame was coded along 
six dimensions: speaker, valence, referent, type, context, and response style. Speaker referred to 
whether the mother or child made the statement. Valence of blame attributions referred to either 
maximizing, mitigating or neutral blame judgments. Related to these were the referents – child 
or peer. Thus, the latter two sets of codes identify a person’s statement as blame 
maximizing/mitigating for either the child or peer.  
 Malle et al.’s (2014) path model of blame and Alicke’s (2000) culpable control model as 
well as research by Alicke and colleagues (2008) provided the framework for coding type of 
blame attributions. Event detection and agent causality (Malle et al., 2014) were collapsed under 
one code, presence of act. All other codes based on Malle and colleagues’ model were 
maintained: Reasons, obligation, and capacity. Foreseeability, avoidability and 
characterological statements were drawn from Alicke (2000) and Alicke and colleagues’ (2008) 
studies. Additionally, consequences, act evaluation and subsequent response were included as 
potential blame attribution strategies. Sub-codes were included for only consequences and 
avoidability. Sub-codes for consequences include types of consequences, including authority 
sanctions, emotional consequence, physical consequence, psychological consequence, and 
relational consequence. Avoidability sub-codes include statements making reference to past 
actuals, past counterfactuals and future hypothetical behavior. 
 The coding scheme incorporated the perceived context of each of the codes: harm to 
child, harm to peer, self-protection and peer-protection. Specifically, the first two contexts for 
blame attributions referred to culpability for harm caused to the other antagonist (the child’s 
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harm to the peer, or the peer’s harm to the child), whereas the latter two contexts referred to the 
child’s or peer’s responsibility for protecting themselves from harm. Finally, for each code, we 
provided information regarding the mother’s and child’s response style in order to gain a general 
sense of how the conversations proceeded; whether the mother or child was challenging the 
other, and whether the child was offering a prompted or spontaneous response. 
Interrater reliability 
 
Interrater reliability was established for all coding. Two independent raters coded 21% (N 
= 7/36) of the transcribed audio-recorded data. One of the raters was blind to the study’s 
hypotheses. First, coders identified all statements or questions by the speakers that pertained to 
blame; as noted above, multiple units were sometimes coded within one conversational turn. 
Agreement or disagreement was computed separately for each coded unit; if the two coders 
agreed that an entire conversational turn should not be coded, this was counted as one agreement.  
Subsequently, each identified unit was coded for valence, referent, type, context, and response 
style. Cohen’s kappas were calculated for each code. Disagreements were resolved via 
discussion and consensus. All the kappas exceeded 0.75. Reliability scores are included in Table 
1. 
Table 1 
Cohen’s Kappas for Interrater Reliabilities 
 Cohen’s kappas 
Conversational contribution relevant to blame .76 
Code .84 
Subcode (consequences) 1.0 
Subcode (avoidability) .91 
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Referent (child/peer) .91 
Valence (mitigating/maximizing/neutral)  .76 
Response styles   
- Challenge .83 







Plan of Analysis 
We examined how mothers and their 6-7-year-old children made blame judgments in 
conversations about occasions on which the child was hurt by a peer. Family was treated as the 
unit of analysis. A series of mixed-model ANOVAs were employed; in each case, child gender 
was entered as a between-subjects factor and type of event (shared fault, no fault) as a repeated 
measure, with other repeated measures (speaker, type of attribution, referent) also entered as 
relevant. The dependent variables were the frequencies of references within a conversation. An 
alpha level of p < .05 was used. Partial eta-squared (η2p) is reported as a measure of effect size 
for significant effects. The Bonferroni correction (p < .05) was used for post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons.   
Mothers’ and Children’s Mitigating and Maximizing Blame Attributions Across Event 
Types 
The goal of the first analysis was to draw comparisons between the two types of 
conversations mothers and children engaged in – shared fault and no-fault conversations – in 
terms of the difference between speakers, valence and context. We conducted a 2 (speaker) x 2 
(valence) x 3 (context) x 2 (event type) x 2 (child gender) mixed-model ANOVA. In terms of 
valence, we focused only on statements in which mothers and children either maximized or 
mitigated blame but excluded neutral statements, such as when they were asking clarifying 
questions (e.g. Did he push you?) or when the speaker was ambivalent about the referent’s 
blameworthiness (e.g. Did you tell her you did not like what she did?). Further, although we 
coded four contexts (namely, harm to child, harm to peer, self-protection, and peer-protection), 
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we excluded statements pertaining to peer protection from the analysis because on average, they 
appeared 8 times across 5 families, which was .22% of all the contributions. 
The analysis revealed main effects of blame attribution for the following: speaker (F (1, 
34) = 17.48, p < .001, η2p = .34), valence (F (1, 34) = 29.9, p < .05, η2p = .47), and context (F (2, 
68) = 10.72, p < .001, η2p = .24). These effects were qualified by the following two- and three-
way interactions: event by valence (F (1, 34) = 10.53, p = .003, η2p = .24), event by context (F 
(2, 68) = 11.26, p < .001, η2p = .25), speaker by context (F (2, 68) = 38.66, p < .001, η2p = .53), 
valence by context (F (2, 68) = 20.65, p < .001, η2p = .38), event by valence by context (F (2, 
68) = 8.01, p = .001, η2p = .19), and speaker by valence by context (F (2, 68) = 18.95, p < .001, 
η2p = .36). The analysis did not reveal any effects for gender. Patterns for each significant effect 
are described below.   
Speaker. Children (M = 2.04, SE = .15) made significantly more blame attributions than 
mothers (M = 1.46, SE = .19).  
Valence. Family members maximized blame (M = 2.33, SE = .24) significantly more 
than they mitigated blame (M = 1.16, SE = .13) during their conversations.  
Context. Family members referred significantly more to peers’ harm against children (M 
= 2.65, SE = .30), as compared to both children’s harm against peers (M = 1.25, SE = .23) and 
children’s self-protection from harm (M = 1.35, SE = .22). There was not a significant difference 
between references to children’s harm against peers and children’s self-protection. 
Event by valence. Overall, speakers tended to maximize blame more in the no fault 
conversation (M = 2.71, SE = .34) than in the shared fault conversation (M = 1.95, SE = .17). In 
contrast, they mitigated blame to the same extent in both the shared fault (M = 1.26, SE = .15) 




Figure 3. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating blame attribution across events. * denotes 
significant difference between event types within a valence category at p < .05 with Bonferroni 
correction. 
 
Event by context. Speakers’ references to harm to the child and self-protection were 
more frequent in the no fault conversation (Ms = 3.22 and 1.69, SEs = .41 and .33 respectively), 
as compared to the shared fault conversation (Ms = 2.08 and 1.01, SEs = 0.24 and 0.18 
respectively). In contrast, speakers’ references to harm to the peer were more frequent in the 
shared fault conversation (M = 1.74, SE = .34) than in the no fault conversation (M = .76, SE = 
.20, see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Frequencies of blame attribution contexts across events. * denotes significant 
















































Speaker by context. Children made significantly more blame attributions (M = 3.44, SE 
= .31) than mothers (M = 1.86, SE = .32) about the peer’s harm to the child. Regarding the 
child’s harm against peer, children also made more blame attributions (M = 1.54, SE = .27) than 
mothers (M = .95, SE = .23). In contrast, for the self-protection context, mothers made 
significantly more blame attributions (M = 1.58, SE = .27) than children (M = 1.13, SE = .19; see 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Frequencies of speakers’ blame attribution across contexts. * denotes significant 
difference between speakers within a context category at p < .05 with Bonferroni correction. 
 
Valence by context. When families discussed blame within the context of harm to the 
child and self-protection, they maximized blame significantly more (M = 4.01, 1.82, SE = .46, 
.36, for harm to child and self-protection, respectively) than they mitigated blame (M = 1.29, .88, 
SE = .21, .16, respectively). Conversely, in the context of the child’s harm against the peer, there 




























Figure 6. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating blame attributions across contexts. * 
denotes significant difference between valence categories within a context at p < .05 with 
Bonferroni correction. 
 
Event by valence by context. In terms of comparisons across types of events for 
statements that maximized blame/responsibility, and as expected, families maximized 
responsibility vis-à-vis the peer’s harm to the child and the child’s responsibility for his/her own 
self-protection more in the no fault conversations (M = 5.12, 2.43, SE = .69, .53 for harm to child 
and self-protection, respectively) than in the shared fault conversations (M = 2.89, 1.21, SE = 
.36, .28, respectively). Conversely, also as anticipated, they maximized blame regarding the 
child’s harm to his/her peer more in the shared fault conversations (M = 1.76, SE = .36) than in 
the no fault conversations (M = .58, SE = .17) (see Figure 7). Families’ blame mitigation did not 


























Figure 7. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating blame attributions across contexts and 
events. * denotes significant difference between event types within a context at p < .05 with 
Bonferroni correction. 
 
Speaker by valence by context. As hypothesized, children maximized blame regarding 
harm to the child him/herself significantly more (M = 5.29, SE = .27) than their mothers (M = 
2.72, SE = .21), whereas mothers more often (M = 2.60, SE = .47) than children (M = 1.04, SE = 
.27) maximized children’s responsibility for protecting themselves from harm (see Figure 8). 
Mothers and children did not differ significantly in the extent to which they maximized blame 
vis-à-vis the child’s harm to his/her peer. With regards to the mitigation of blame, children more 
often mitigated blame in all contexts - i.e. harm to child (M = 1.58, SE = .26), harm to peer (M = 
2.00, SE = .46) and self-protection contexts (M = 1.20, SE = .20) - as compared to their mothers 




























Figure 8. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating blame attributions across contexts and 
speakers. * denotes significant difference between speakers within a context at p < .05 with 
Bonferroni correction. 
 
Types of Blame Attributions  
We also examined the particular ways in which families referred to blame. Out of the ten 
coded categories of blame attributions, three were excluded from analysis because they arose 
very infrequently in conversations. The excluded categories were capacity, obligation and 
foreseeability. Challenges by both mother and child were also too infrequent to be included. 
Analysis of the seven retained categories of blame attributions revealed main effects for type of 
blame attribution F (6, 210) = 20.38, p < .001, η2p = .37, and the following two-way interactions: 
type of blame attribution by speaker (F (6, 210) = 18.96, p < .001, η2p = .35), type of blame 
attribution by valence (F (6, 210) = 11.93, p < .001, η2p = .25), but no effects of child gender.  
Frequencies of codes. The frequency of the seven types of blame attribution occurred in 
the following order: Avoidability, consequences, reasons for harmful action, act evaluations, 
presence of acts, subsequent responses, and character evaluations (see Figure 9). Avoidability 
emerged significantly more (M = 3.42, SE = .46) than act evaluation (M = 1.41, SE = .21), 






























evaluation occurred significantly more (M = 1.41, SE = .21) than presence of act (M = 1.21, SE = 
.10) and subsequent response (M = 1.04, SE = .14). Families referred to consequences more often 
(M = 2.97, SE = .36) than act evaluation, presence of act and subsequent responses. They also 
referred to reasons for harmful action significantly more than (M = 3.42, SE = .46) only character 
evaluation. Character evaluation emerged significantly less than all other codes (M = 0.40, SE = 
.10). 
 
Figure 9. Frequencies of mothers’ and children’s blame attribution types. 
 
 Frequencies of blame attribution types across speakers. With respect to differences 
between family members, mothers employed more act evaluations and references to avoidability 
(Ms = 1.83 and 4.81, SEs = 0.58 and 0.28 respectively) as compared to their children (Ms = 0.99 
and 2.65, SEs = 0.20 and 0.37 respectively). In contrast, children referred to presence of harmful 
act, and individuals’ subsequent responses to their own harmful actions (Ms = 1.74 and 1.28, SEs 





















respectively). Character evaluation, consequences of harmful action, reasons for harmful action 
were used equally by both mothers and children, (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Frequencies of mothers’ and children’s use of each type of blame attribution. * 
denotes significant difference between speakers within a blame attribution type at p < .05 with 
Bonferroni correction. 
 
Frequencies of blame attribution types across valence. Comparing the extent to which 
families maximized and mitigated blame for the child and peer, the analysis revealed that 
families were equally likely to maximize and mitigate act evaluations, character evaluations, 
reasons and subsequent responses (see Figure 11). Regarding avoidability, families maximized 
significantly more (M = 8.53, SE = 1.38) than they mitigated blame (M = 3.54, SE = 0.49). They 
also maximized blame for consequences of harmful actions (M = 6.83, SE = 0.89) significantly 
more than they mitigated (M = 2.33, SE = 0.52). In terms of presence of acts, families 










Act evaluation Avoidability Character
evaluation





















Figure 11. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating statements across different types of blame 
attributions. * denotes significant difference between valence categories within a blame 
attribution type at p < .05 with Bonferroni correction. 
 
Sub-types of Blame Attributions  
 We further examined the specific ways in which families discussed consequences and 
avoidability while making blame attributions. Regarding consequences, five subtypes emerged 
including consequences of authority, emotions, relations, as well as physical and psychological 
consequences. Families referred to future hypotheticals, past actuals and past counterfactuals. 
Frequencies of the sub-types are presented below. Analysis revealed a main effect for subtype of 
blame attribution by valence (F (7, 245) = 11.15, p < .001, η2p = .24), but no effect of gender. 
Frequencies of consequence sub-codes. The frequency of the five subtypes of blame 
attribution regarding consequences occurred in the following order: emotional consequence, 
relational consequence, authority’s consequence, physical consequence, and psychological 
consequence (see Figure 12). Emotional consequence (M = 1.38, SE = .15) emerged significantly 
more often than authority sanctions (M = 0.52, SE = .11), physical consequence (M = 0.25, SE = 
.09), psychological consequence (M = 0.19, SE = .08), and relational consequence (M = 0.64, SE 
































0.52, SE = .11), which emerged significantly more than psychological consequence (M = 0.19, 
SE = .08). 
 
Figure 12. Frequencies of consequence subtypes of blame attribution. 
 Frequencies of avoidability sub-codes. The frequency of the three subtypes of blame 
attribution regarding avoidability occurred in the following order: past actuals, future 
hypotheticals, and past counterfactuals (see Figure 13). Families referred significantly less to 
past counterfactuals (M = 0.38, SE = .10) compared to both past actuals (M = .91, SE = .20) and 
future hypotheticals (M = .91, SE = .20). Future hypotheticals and past counterfactuals did not 
differ significantly. 
 


























Frequencies of sub-types of blame attribution across valence. Sub-types of blame 
attribution were further coded for consequences and avoidability of harm. Families maximized 
blame (M = 1.39, SE = 0.31) more than they mitigated blame (M = 0.19, SE = 0.09) for 
authority’s consequence (i.e., times the offender got into trouble with an authority figure such as 
a teacher or principal). They also maximized more (M = 3.86, SE = 0.48) than they mitigated 
responsibility (M =0.53, SE = 0.14) when referring to emotional consequences of harm. On 
occasions where they discussed possible measures to avoid harm in the future (future 
hypotheticals) they maximized significantly more (M = 3.42, SE = 0.70) than they mitigated 
blame (M = 0.81, SE = 0.24). Yet again, blame was maximized (M = 0.58, SE = 0.20) 
significantly more than mitigated (M = 0.17, SE = 0.10) when families talked about physical 
consequences of harm. Only for relational consequences did they mitigate blame (M = 1.28, SE 
= 0.32) significantly more than they maximized blame (M = 0.44, SE = 0.16; see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Frequencies of maximizing and mitigating blame attributions across sub-types of 
consequences and avoidability. * denotes significant difference between valence categories 















































 The goal of this study was to investigate the various strategies that mothers and their 6-7 
year-old children employ to make blame attributions when engaged in conversations about two 
peer conflicts in which the child was the victim of harm – one to which the child felt they 
contributed (shared fault) and the other to which they felt they did not contribute to the fight (no 
fault). This study provides understanding regarding specific ways in which mothers and children 
of this particular life stage explore who is responsible or blameworthy for children’s varied 
conflicts with peers.   
Specifically, this study addressed the following research questions: (1) how do the shared 
fault conversations differ from the no fault conversations in terms of valence (mitigating and 
maximizing blame/responsibility) and context (harm to child, harm to peer, self-protection)? (2) 
how do mothers and children differ from each other in how they maximize and mitigate blame in 
varying contexts? (3) what are the specific dimensions that mothers and children draw on to 
make blame attributions and how do they use them? The findings related to these research 
questions as well as implications of the findings for moral agency development are discussed in 
this section. It is worth noting that although effects of gender were examined, no significant 
gender differences emerged. Thus, gender differences will not be discussed.  
Either way, you are responsible: Mothers’ context-specific responsibility attributions 
 The first aim of the study was to compare the shared fault and no fault conversations 
regarding maximizing and mitigating blame attributions in specific contexts – harm to child, 
harm to peer and self-protection. We expected families to maximize the child’s blame for harm 
against the peer when the child thought the conflict was partly their fault, and similarly, to 
maximize the peer’s blame when the child did not contribute to the conflict. Finally, we expected 
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that when the child thought the conflict was not his/her fault, mothers would maximize 
responsibility for the child’s failure to protect himself from harm. Our findings are discussed in 
light of these hypotheses, which were all supported. 
As expected, families made more statements that maximized blame regarding the child’s 
harm against the peer when the child acknowledged that the conflict was partly their fault. On 
the contrary, when children did not think they had contributed to causing the conflict, they, 
together with their mothers, maximized responsibility more for the peers’ harm against the child. 
Thus, our findings suggest mothers and children of this age are listening to and largely agreeing 
with each other in their understandings of events. That is, as has been noted in past research 
(Scirocco et al., 2018), mothers appear to be sensitive to the variations in children’s accounts of 
their conflict experiences.  
More specifically, when children mentioned their harm against a peer, mothers 
underscored the blameworthiness of their actions (e.g., “you have to be nice to people and not 
break their hearts”, “that’s not nice, you wouldn’t like someone to do that to you”).  These real 
examples from shared fault conversations from this study are an indication that, when mothers 
note their children’s contributions to the conflict, they aim to support children’s concern for 
others. Similarly, they underscore the peer’s lack of concern for the child when they mention 
harm against the child, (e.g., “It sounds like he goes out of his way to say mean things 
sometimes”, “that’s not respectful”). 
Also, as hypothesized, families maximized children’s responsibility for protecting 
themselves from harm particularly when children felt they did not contribute to the conflict. This 
suggests a belief that there could have been a way for children to avoid getting [more] hurt. 
Mothers asked, for instance, “Well, she didn’t think you had a good singing voice, what did you 
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say to her then?”, “Next time, you have to report the person to your teacher, or your principal”, 
“Well, you can tell them about your feelings. You can tell them "Stop, it hurts my feelings," 
right?”.  Contained within statements and questions regarding self-protection are efforts to 
confirm whether or not the child took a specific action to deal with the harm thrown at them; 
either via confrontation, physically responding, or redirecting attention. Mothers are also 
suggesting both what children could have or should have done to potentially prevent getting hurt. 
Thus, arguably, these strategies reflect mothers’ emphasis on supporting the coping skills of their 
children.  
Socialization of coping involves parents’ deliberate measures to encourage their children 
to either engage with (e.g., by confrontation, assertion) or disengage from (e.g., by denial, 
withdrawal) stressors. Disengagement has been shown to undermine children’s ability to 
successfully manage their emotions and relationships (Abaied & Rudolph, 2010). Findings from 
our dataset imply that mothers are generally encouraging children to engage with the stressor 
although there are occasions on which some mothers also endorse disengaging (e.g., “Instead of 
just ending the game, you could just avoid him”, “so then why do you keep playing with her?”). 
On the whole however, families typically discussed specific ways for children to protect 
themselves from [further] hurt by directly engaging with the stressor or source of harm (i.e., the 
peer, typically).  
Another way in which mothers seemed to be encouraging engagement was by asking 
children to seek adult intervention (e.g., did you go tell the teacher?”, “did you go tell an adult 
afterwards?” “just come back home and tell mommy, okay?”) and attempt to repair relationships 
(e.g., “So you never pushed him again,” “do you and N talk again?” “You should include 
everybody, it doesn’t take long to teach her how to dance,” “what do you think you could do to 
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try a compromise,” “did you say sorry?”) (Scirocco et al., 2018). These coping suggestions are 
helpful for children’s navigation of their social-moral experiences, moving forward in particular. 
Mothers are directly encouraging children to aim for conflict resolution in such a way that the 
children are simultaneously feeling supported. Even more significantly, mothers were 
consistently “refusing” to allow their children to be passive recipients of harm, thus, their 
parental approach was largely to facilitate children’s development of their own sense of 
responsibility, even as a victim in a conflict. 
 These findings are interesting inasmuch as mothers’ approaches seem to be holding 
children responsible across conflicts, albeit in different ways. That is, when children feel 
partially at fault, mothers seem to agree. When they feel they are not at fault, mothers do not 
challenge their children’s perspective directly, but nevertheless specify aspects of the past event 
in which children could be held responsible for protecting themselves from harm. Obviously, due 
to the peer’s absence during the conversation and mothers’ focus on their children’s moral 
growth, there was very little reference to the peer’s self-protection (peer-protection). This is 
understandable, because mothers may be particularly focused on helping their own children to 
gain control over victimizing situations and ultimately learn to actively protect themselves from 
harm.   
I’m not responsible for harm! Children victims’ blame absolution and mothers’ standpoint 
The second aim was to compare mothers and their children’s blame attribution strategies. 
We sought to answer the question: what are mothers’ and children’s distinct contributions to 
conversations in terms of maximizing and mitigating blame in particular contexts? We expected 
children to maximize harm against themselves and mitigate their harm against the peer, in both 
cases more than mothers. In contrast, we expected mothers to maximize responsibility in the 
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context of self-protection. Again, these expectations were met, and additional findings also 
emerged.  
It is worth noting that we excluded all statements that were neutral, thus since mothers 
were more likely to play the role of enquirers/listeners, some of their contributions were not 
included in analyses. For instance, mothers would often say “tell me what happened” or “mm-
hmm’ (nodding) to show children they were listening. This may be one main reason we found 
that children made more blame attributions generally than their mothers did. This pattern of 
children attributing blame more than mothers can also be explained by the nature of the research 
protocol; specifically, children initiated both conversations by recounting their experience that 
would form the focus of the discussion; thus, in some respects, children guided the direction of 
the conversations (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). As victims of harm, who were hurt, mad or upset, 
it is reasonable that children maximized blame for peers’ harm against them more than mothers 
did (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). Presumably, they had specific reasons to blame the peer based 
on evidence drawn from their memories of the harmful events. Based on the evidence children 
provided, mothers were given the opportunity to make spontaneous blame judgments (Alicke, 
2000) along the same lines, blaming the peer for causing harm to their child. However, mothers 
did not simply mirror children’s evaluations; they maximized the peer’s blame much less than 
children. In contrast, as noted above, they more often focused on children’s capacity for self-
protection than their children and maximized their responsibility in this context.  
It was interesting but counterintuitive to find that children were more likely to mitigate 
responsibility than their mothers, not only for their harm against peers (which makes sense when 
they play the role of perpetrators; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010) and their own inability to protect 
themselves from harm but also, for the peers’ harm against them. In terms of explaining 
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children’s tendency to also mitigate their peer’s responsibility for harming them, multiple factors 
may contribute to this finding. We speculate that (1) in some cases, conflicts were already 
resolved to children’s satisfaction (e.g., “she said sorry, so I didn’t tell the teacher”), and (2) 
children sometimes viewed their peers’ motivations or actions as legitimate (e.g., “She didn’t 
hurt me, but hurt me a bit,” “She was trying to throw it against the tree and by accident, it went a 
little too far”). In line with Wainryb and colleagues (2005), this finding may reflect that children 
of this age sometimes consider their peers’ legitimate goals as less blameworthy and therefore 
mitigate blame judgments. An example in this study is: “We were playing tag, I tagged him, he 
was it, he wanted to try to tag me but he by accident pushed me”. By way of interpretation, the 
peer in this story had a legitimate goal of tagging the child. The harmful behavior – pushing the 
child – only occurred by accident, which is most probably why the child mitigated blame.  
In this light, one important moderating factor may be the type of relationship between the 
child and their peer; research suggests a certain level of care and caution within child friendships 
due to an awareness of potential termination of the relationship (Komolova & Wainryb, 2011). 
Thus, children may make benign attributions regarding their friends’ motives, whereas mothers 
may be less likely to do so. Potentially, mothers would rather have their children draw lessons 
from perceived bad behavior of their peers. Their concern may possibly be that children would 
mitigate their harm against others along the same lines.  
In sum, children are generally mitigating their harm across all contexts, whether they 
were harmed or harmed the peer, as well as when issues about their self-protection from harm 
arose. Regarding children’s mitigating peers’ blame for harm against them, mothers’ standpoint 
seems to be that children call a spade a spade. Both mothers and children mitigated blame for the 
child’s harm against the peer. Self-protection was largely maximized by mothers as discussed in 
 44 
 
the latter part of the previous section. Even though mothers and children tended to be on the 
same page, when mothers and children diverged, children were more likely to absolve their guilt, 
whereas mothers were emphasizing their responsibility. These findings seem to have 
implications for moral growth, if mothers are assisting children to avoid passivity, although they 
may also occasionally be imposing moral lessons on children that are less embraced. Overall, 
however, the level of listening and agreement between both parties presents a healthy image of 
constructive conversation that aids children’s moral reasoning. 
Elements and frequencies of mothers’ and children’s blame strategies 
The third aim of the study was to investigate the dimensions that mothers and their 6-7-
year-olds focused on to attribute blame/responsibility. Because there was little previous research 
to guide this aspect of the study, no particular hypotheses were advanced. That is, our goal was 
simply to document variations among types and subtypes of blame attribution in terms of 
mothers’ and children’s usage, extent of maximization versus mitigation and possible variations 
in context. 
As mentioned previously, young children tend to focus more on factual rather than 
interpretive information in their accounts of conflict (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). This was 
evident in this study. Children identified the presence of harmful acts (e.g., “that day, he took my 
hat and I told him to give it back but he did not give it back”) more often than mothers, and 
referred more to offenders’ subsequent actions (e.g., “And after, I went over, and just told her 
that, do you want to play with me now? And she said yes”). Mothers, on the other hand, leaned 
towards interpretation, a valuable tool for centering children’s thinking on personal and others’ 
goals, beliefs and desires. They evaluated actions more often than children (e.g., “but the general 
story is that you felt she wasn’t respecting you,” “Nobody really wants to hurt anybody 
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intentionally, and if they do, it's them that should probably take the time to reflect about what 
they said and about what they did, right?”). In these two examples, mothers appear to be getting 
to the bottom of children’s stories; the first reflects the child’s feelings, and the second, desires, 
and repair of relationships. 
Although 6-7-year-old children’s narratives may not be as rich in interpretation as those 
of older children, Pasupathi and Wainryb’s (2010) research reveals that early school-aged 
children nevertheless can and do include psychological concepts in their narratives. Similarly, 
many children in this study alluded to the peer’s and their own reasons for harming, their 
feelings, thoughts, etc. (e.g., “I think it’s because she wants to seem cool and better than 
everyone else,” “so they really made me feel like a reject,” “he pushed me on purpose,” and “He 
was just being sarcastic”). Furthermore, these conversations provided opportunities for parents to 
scaffold children’s reasoning about both the event and the players involved in order to help the 
child grapple effectively with harm (Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). In this study, mothers did raise 
questions and statements to stimulate children to consider possible underlying reasons for harm, 
as well as emotions, among other psychological concepts. For instance, “was she just not careful, 
or was it on purpose?” “Well, you’re not telling me that part. What were you really fighting 
about?” “why do you think O is saying bad words?” By answering these questions, children 
reflect deeper and make connections, moving beyond the “landscape of action” (which 
encompasses only observable aspects of the conflict) to the “landscape of consciousness” 
(drawing the meaning of the event). Thus, by eliciting children’s narration of more interpretive 
information, mothers are facilitating the growth of moral agency (Bruner, 1990).  
Capacity, obligation and foreseeability were excluded from analyses, because children at 
this age and their mothers referenced each very infrequently. Considering that each of these 
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concepts is related to the notion of preventing/avoiding harm, their minimal usage is notable 
because avoidability – analogous to preventability – emerged most often than any other blame 
attribution type. Why the disparity, then? Obligation behooves the child or peer to have 
prevented a negative outcome because of their significant role in the relationship. As such, 
references to obligation indicate that the culprit holds substantial influence over the situation or 
other party involved (Malle et al., 2014). This was probably not the case in most of the events 
that were the focus of this study; since many involved similarly-aged peers, we expect them to 
have been of equal influence. The closest the conversations came to examples of obligation were 
friendship-related (i.e., “You don’t break your friends’ hearts” and “you should not always do 
what your friend wants you to do”). In turn, capacity and foreseeability reflect relatively 
sophisticated forms of blame attribution; discussing knowledge, skills, tools and opportunities 
available to children to both draw from internally and to consider in anticipating harm may 
require more developmentally-advanced reasoning. Thus, in the conversations, families were 
referring to avoidability more as specific actions which did, could have, or will prevent harm, 
and less as most abstract cognitive/mental resources available for harm prevention.  
In terms of the frequencies of the different types of blame attributions, families 
particularly discussed blame via references to avoidability and consequences (about one-fifth of 
the time in each case). As such, we elaborate more on the meaning of these types of blame 
attributions in the subsections below.  
Consequences. Findings suggest that emotional consequences for children (compared to 
relational and physical consequences and consequences from authority figures) were the main 
focus of the conversations and were used when maximizing responsibility about five times more 
than during mitigation. Alicke (2000) suggests a blame mode of processing via spontaneous 
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evaluations which attributes the greatest blame to the person who generates the most negative 
affect in the victim. Specifically, he posits that spontaneous reactions derive from evidential 
information, which in the case of this study, are elements of the child’s account of the peer 
conflict. Children made comments such as “It made me feel really rejected and it made me feel 
sad”. Mothers typically extended the emotional consequence either to signal listening or to 
highlight the causes of the child’s emotions (e.g., “It makes you feel upset that he is telling you 
that you don’t know how to pitch properly?”).  
It is also important to note however, that 6-7-year-olds have the potential to draw links 
between an offender’s intentions and the outcomes of their actions; they consider motives behind 
actions rather than exclusively focusing on observable outcomes of harmful actions (Killen et al., 
2011). Notably, after avoidability and consequences, families (mothers and children equally) 
referred most to reasons for harmful actions. In fact, referring to reasons as a type of blame 
attribution provides a necessary foundation for evaluating consequences as intentional, thus 
blameworthy, or otherwise. However, because these children were somewhat more focused on 
consequences, conversations naturally followed that path. It behooves mothers, therefore, to take 
advantage of children’s emphasis on consequences (outcomes) but also to help them to link such 
consequences to reasons (intent to harm). Although, research suggests that mothers do scaffold 
children’s understanding of the psychological facets of their experiences (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 
2010), our findings suggest that this may not be an area of as much concern for our sample 
compared to issues of avoidability/preventability of harm and self-protection.  
Avoidability. This type of blame attribution occurred more frequently than all others and 
mostly in the self-protection context, which has been discussed. When families spoke about 
avoidability, they were more often maximizing than mitigating responsibility. Avoidability was 
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most often discussed in terms of the child’s actual behavior in the past (i.e., what children 
actually did to avoid harm). We reason that this may be the most basic form of ensuring attempts 
at preventing harm. That is, based on the knowledge of what children are actually doing, mothers 
can then potentially build on this by suggesting future means of avoiding harm and past 
counterfactuals, respectively. Past counterfactuals may have been the least referenced because 
compared to future suggestions, suggestions regarding the past cannot aid children to undo the 
harm. It seems more reasonable to talk about what children should do “next time” compared to 
what they “could have done” to avoid harm.  
Families mostly maximized responsibility when speaking about measures to prevent 
being harmed in the future (e.g., “So you should be deciding not to hang out with her too much”) 
and possible ways children could have avoided harming the peer or getting hurt by the peer in 
the past (e.g., “Remember we decided probably it was best not to bring your cards to school,” “I 
think if you had told him that it hurt your feelings I think he would've understood that pretty 
well”), but not for past actual behavior. By age 6, children can more skillfully reason 
counterfactually compared to two to three years prior (Beck et al., 2006). Nevertheless, 
counterfactual thinking continues to develop across school-aged years and into adolescence, and 
thus mothers of this age-group may still need to scaffold refinement in counterfactual thinking. It 
may therefore be helpful for mothers to more frequently discuss past counterfactuals because 
future hypothetical thinking is mostly developed by age 4. However, maternal goals are 
presumably separate from improving cognitive reasoning capacities, and largely focused on 




Instilling responsibility in children: Beneficial or not? 
Taken together, it appears that mothers’ paramount intent was to instill a sense of 
responsibility in their 6-7-year-olds, particularly when children believe they did not contribute to 
the conflict. Considering that the child was always a victim of harm across events, mothers then 
appear to be discouraging them from taking no responsibility (being passive recipients of harm). 
Thus, questions, strategies and suggestions to facilitate children’s thinking regarding avoiding 
harm appear to be tools that mothers are using to help their children navigate victimizing 
experiences, and to learn to take self-defensive actions. 
Moral agency development is likely facilitated by this approach to instill responsibility. 
As mentioned, self-protection was mostly based on references to avoidability including 
references to past actual, past counterfactual and future hypothetical behavior. The latter two 
subtypes are characterized by precise measures to be (have been) safe from harm via evaluating 
events and planning for future ones respectively. Moral agency is catalyzed by such planning and 
evaluation: specifically, via tough-decision-making, adjusting desires and making compromises, 
all of which are involved with avoiding harm. For instance, one mother who suggested that her 
child stop playing with the hurtful peer was guiding her child to make a tough decision to end 
what she perceived to be a destructive relationship with a playmate.  
At the heart of moral agency is understanding one’s own and others’ goals and beliefs. In 
attempting to draw meaning and support the child’s self-protection strategies (e.g., 
compromising, etc. as mentioned above), mothers delved into internal states of both the child and 
the peer. For instance, one mother said:  
So, it's okay for you to stand up right? And to say, you know "I am going to do what I’m 
doing, and you have to accept that." Because people have to be accepting of you, that's 
important, right? And also, you remember like for [peer], she's telling you like you can't 
play with her or she doesn't want to be your friend anymore. In that case you can also 
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reflect upon that and say "Well, if that's how you like to be, then that's okay with me. I 
mean, I'm going to go do something else”.  
 
This particular mother is scaffolding moral agency by highlighting the peer’s goal to 
terminate friendship (“she doesn’t want to be your friend”) and emphasizing the importance of 
tolerance (“people have to be accepting of you”). Based on these interpretations and values, she 
is suggesting self-protection strategies: to speak up assertively (“it’s okay for you to stand up”) 
or to withdraw when necessary (“if that’s how you like to be… I’m going to go do something 
else”). It is worthy to note that this mother did not push her suggestions down the child’s throat. 
Eventually, both agree on these approaches to handling the conflict. 
A drawback for self-protection would occur if mothers overemphasized the child’s failure 
to self-protect. That is, by focusing on self-protection, perhaps some mothers were invalidating 
children’s hurt and perhaps even implying that children were to blame for their own 
victimization? Hopefully, the extent of agreement between mothers and their children in this 
sample suggests that this was not the typical pattern. Relatedly, given that children were 
mitigating their self-protection more than their mothers, it is worth mentioning that parents ought 
to be careful not to make the mistake of insisting on their own values and overlooking children’s 
own perspectives (e.g., being intrusive; Poulin, Nadeau, & Scaramella, 2012). This strategy, 
especially in the approaching adolescent years, may interfere with children’s socioemotional 
adjustment and make them reluctant to disclose to parents in morality-related conversations (an 
important vehicle for moral agency development; Wainryb & Recchia, 2017). In this study, 
mothers appear to have taken the more profitable course of assisting children to consider 





  This study examined blame attributions in actual conversations instead of hypothetical 
vignettes (Coplan et al., 2002; Dix et al., 1986; Miller, 1995). The advantage was the 
understanding attained from mother-child discussions of children’s actual past conflicts. 
However, this design prevented us from measuring specific processes in [more] detail when they 
rarely arose. For instance, considering that Malle and colleagues (2014) mentioned capacity and 
obligation on their blame models, vignettes could have been designed to provoke discussions of 
these concerns. Their infrequency in the data, however, caused us to eliminate them from 
analyses and make possible assumptions about their rare use within early school year stages. 
 Furthermore, the study’s findings cannot be generalized to fathers because only mothers 
were included. Focusing exclusively on mothers may cause a skewed representation of parental 
socialization processes. This is particularly because fathers differ in their parenting strategies 
(Simons & Conger, 2007). Thus, having just one parent may be limiting to fully understand 
socialization. Finally, although our sample was more diverse than in some similar investigations, 
the study’s findings are mainly generalizable to well-educated families of European descent in 
Quebec. 
Implications and Future Directions 
 This study sought to investigate mothers’ and their 6-7-year-old children’s blame 
attribution strategies when engaged in conversations about children’s past peer conflicts. The 
two conversations centered on a conflict to which the child contributed and another to which 
they felt they did not. The findings indicate that, in spite of the context of the conversation, 
mothers were largely in agreement with children regarding their contributions to the conflict, but 
more noteworthy is their reorientation in the case of non-contribution to conflict. Mothers shifted 
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attention from blaming the peer in this conversation, to placing responsibility on the child for not 
ensuring they were unaffected by the peer’s harm.  
 This maternal outlook has implications for the bidirectional process of socialization and 
moral agency development. To the extent that mothers are promoting children’s active 
engagement in conflicts with or without pressuring children’s thinking to align with theirs, they 
can maintain a thriving relationship with their children or place roadblocks between them, 
hindering child disclosure, respectively. Thus, a future direction for this study could be to, apart 
from coding challenges, investigate mother-child connectedness within the realm of maternal 
self-protection suggestions. 
 Moral agency development has been at the heart of theoretical framework that served as 
the motivation for this study. Evidently, mothers and children evaluated motives, desires, beliefs 
and emotions of both child and peer across all contexts. They frequently emphasized 
consequences and reasons which signal discussions regarding intentions behind harmful 
outcomes. Beyond reasons and consequences, avoidability (past counterfactuals and future 
hypotheticals especially), particularly within self-protection contexts, compelled weighing the 
offender’s goals and drawing on personal beliefs to plan for subsequent self-protection from 
harm. All these blame attribution types created avenues to support children’s moral agency 
development. 
Ultimately, the findings of this study may inform interventions that aim to encourage 
parental listening, moral socialization in conversations with 6-7-year-olds, as well as effective 
blame/responsibility modeling. Arguably, the nature of parents’ blaming is likely to influence 
children’s own blaming strategies. Thus, it would also be beneficial to conduct a follow-up study 
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to investigate how children are navigating blaming and conflict resolution to observe links 
between mothers’ prior suggestions and children’s current strategies. 
Altogether, mothers are supporting children’s moral agency by attending to and being 
responsive to the particulars of children’s stories, being sensitive to the contextual variations in 
attributing blame and responsibility. Also, they are facilitating meaning-making by 
understanding psychological aspects of the conflict and helping children to think along those 
lines. Ultimately, this study situates blame and responsibility within a framework of parent-child 
conversations about conflicts. It thus makes a contribution to understand how children’s 
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Category Code Sub-code Description Example 
Speaker - Mother (m) - The mother is the person 
attributing blame 
 
M: And did you 
ever talk to 
Hannah about it? 
 - Child (c) - The child is the one attributing 
blame 
 
C: I spoke to her 
but she refused to 
listen! 
Type - Presence of act 
(pres_act) 




Child Max (C): I 
hurt his feelings. 
Peer Mit (M): 
She did not push 
you. 
- Reasons (reas) - Motivation, feeling, effort, 
intent to harm.  
Examples:  
Was action provoked? 
Was harm intentional?  
Was goal of the action 
instrumental, benevolent, 
hostile, etc.? 
Was the action emotionally-
driven? 
Did the person have a valid 
reason to perform the action? 
 
 
Child Mit (M):  
So it sounds like 
the ball just 
slipped out of 
your fingers.  
Child Max (C):  
I was trying to 
hurt him/tease 
him/get back at 





- Should or could the person 
have known the consequence 
of the referent’s harmful action 
or the effect on the person 
himself?  
Child Max (M): 
You should have 
known that your 
words would 
make her sad. 
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Should/could the person have 
predicted the harm caused or 
their own hurt? 
Child Mit (C): I 
don’t know her 
well enough to 
know when she’s 








Should/could referent have 
taken an action to either 
avoid/prevent harm or avoid 




Harm to peer  
Child Max (C): I 
could have told 
her to stop instead 
of hitting her. 
Self-protection  
Child Mit (M): I 
can't think of any 
way you could 
have handled it or 
anything else you 
could have 
done to avoid 
getting hurt. 
- Past actuals 
(p_ac) 
Did referent actually take an 
action to avoid/prevent harm 
or prevent themselves from 
getting hurt?  
Yes=Mit, No=Max 
Harm to peer 
Child Mit (C): I 
tried to keep 
myself from 
hitting him back.  
Self-protection  
Child Max (M): 
You did not tell 





Does referent have an option 
about what to do differently in 
the future to avoid/prevent 
harm or to avoid getting hurt?  
Yes=Max, Mit=No 
 
Also, no other alternatives to 
what referent actually already 
did = Mit 
 
Harm to peer  
Child Mit (M): 
Honestly, I think 
next time she does 
that, you don't 
have any other 
choice except to 
respond how you 
did. 
Child Max (C): 
Next time I will 
respond with 





Child Mit (M): I 
really don't think 
you will ever be 
able to get her to 
stop saying mean 
words  
Child Max (C): 
Next time, I 
should just get a 
teacher if she tries 









can be double-coded when the 
flaw refers also to one’s 
capacity or their reasons for 
causing harm as well as 
foreseeability. 
 
Child Mit (M): 
Everyone knows 
how gentle you 
are; I don’t think 
you intended to 
hurt him (charac 
+ reas). 
Peer Max (C): 
That boy has 




- Capacity (capa) - Does person have the abilities, 
skills and knowledge to avoid 




Child Max (M): I 
have taught you 
how to behave 
with other kids. 
Peer Mit (C): She 
doesn’t yet know 





- Is this person in a 
position/status (as a close 
friend, older, more mature, 
Child Max (M): 
Just because she’s 
a friend doesn’t 
mean that you 
 61 
 
etc.) that is relevant to their 
blameworthiness? 
Does speaker expect better 
from referent because of their 
role in relation to the peer? 
Yes=Max, No=Mit 
 
need to do 
everything she 
wants. 
Peer Max (C): I 
am the younger 
kid; she should 
know better than 










Negative impact of harm on 
emotions/feelings 
Peer Mit (M): It 
doesn’t seem your 
feelings were hurt 
when she said 
that. 
- Physical (phys) Negative impact of harm on 
the physical body 
Peer Max (C): 
He scratched my 
arm so hard, I 
bled. 
- Material (mat) Negative impact of harm on 
other’s property 
Child Max (M): 




Negative impact of harm on 
the peer relationship 
Child Mit (C): I 
did not snub him 
after that incident. 
- Psychological 
(psych) 
Negative impact of harm on 
self-image/worth/ self-
evaluation, self-esteem, body 
image, etc. 
Peer max (M): It 
appears he hurt 






Authority (teacher, principal, 
etc.) blames offender. 
Peer Max (C): 
Well, she got into 





- Act evaluation 
(act_eval) 
- Can referent’s action be 
described as “wrong” or 
“right”? 
 
The speaker is either praising 
(mit) or criticizing (max) the 
referent for an action. 
 
Child Mit (M): I 
think leaving the 
scene was just 
fine.  
Child Max (C): I 
felt so bad I did 
the wrong thing! 
Peer Max (M): It 
was not nice of 





- Did person show 
remorsefulness or 
remorselessness? Did they 
attempt to make reparations or 
perpetuate their own earlier 
harm? 
 
Subsequent response is only 
for offender’s own 
harm/wrongful act. 
 
Child Max (M): 
You knew she 
was upset yet you 
kept calling her by 
the same name. 
Child Mit (C): I 
felt so bad I’ve 
never done it 
again. 
Peer Mit (M): I 
think he made it 
clear that he 
regrets what he 
did at that time. 
Referent - Child - The child is the blameworthy 
person in the speaker’s 
statement 
Child Max (M): 
And you don't 
shout at anyone, 
okay? 
- Peer - The peer is the blameworthy 
person in the speaker’s 
statement 
Peer Max (M): 
He was trying to 
put you into 
trouble. 
Valence - Maximizing 
blame (max) 
- Speaker judges referent 
(action/behavior/outcome) as 
blameworthy. 
Peer Max (C): I 
just don't want to 
lend my stuff to 





- Mitigating blame 
(mit) 
- Speaker judges referent 
(action/behavior/outcome) as 
not blameworthy. 
Peer Mit (C): She 
is usually friendly 
so I know she did 
not mean to hurt 
me. 
 
 - Neutral statement 
(neut) 
- Speaker is ambivalent or 
uncertain if referenct’s action/ 
behavior/outcome is 
blameworthy. 
Child neut (M): 
Were you mean to 





- Challenge (chall) - The mother/child is countering 
a statement made by the other. 
The speaker should not be 
challenging the child’s action 
in the conflict.  
C: No! Your 
advice to tell 
someone they're a 
dick next time 
will never help! 
M: But I'm 
saying, like 
maybe call him 
out that he's just 




- The child is directly answering 
the mother.  
M: Did he play 
well?  





- The child provides information 
which has not been 
directly/clearly requested by 
the mother. 
M: Did he play 
well?  
C: Yeah, so that's 
why he was 
pissed. Because 
he played well 











refers to the peer’s harm to the 
child.  
 
Peer Max (M): 
She called you 
names you did not 
like. 
Peer Mit (C): He 
did nothing to 
upset me. 
- Harm to peer 
(harm_peer) 
- The blameworthiness/ 
responsibility refers to the 
child’s harm to the peer.  
 
Child Max (M): 
You kept on 
bothering him. 
Child Mit (C): 
My words were 





- The blameworthiness/ 
responsibility refers to child’s 
self-protection for harm by the 
peer.  
 
Child Mit (M): 
It’s a good thing 
you told him how 
you felt; I’m sure 
he will be careful 
next time. 
Child Max (C): I 
should have 
moved away from 







refers to peer’s self-protection 
for harm by the child.  
 
Peer Mit (C): He 
did tell me to stop 
calling him 
names. 
Peer Max (M): 
And he could 
have told you, 
"I'm not in the 
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right mood. Can 
you please not?" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
